The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear against the Nonspeciesist Paradigm: A Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature by Horta, Oscar
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
163
The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear against the 

Nonspeciesist Paradigm:

A Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature
 
Oscar Horta 

Fundación Española para la Ciencia y la Tecnología
 
Visiting Scholar Department of Philosophy 

Rutgers University 

ohorta@dilemata.net
 
Abstract 
Humans often intervene in the wild for anthropocentric or 
environmental reasons. An example of such interventions is the 
reintroduction of wolves in places where they no longer live in order
to create what has been called an “ecology of fear”, which is being 
currently discussed in places such as Scotland. In the first part of this 
paper I discuss the reasons for this measure and argue that they are 
not compatible with a nonspeciesist approach. Then, I claim that if 
we abandon a speciesist viewpoint we should change completely the
way in which we should intervene in nature. Rather than intervening 
for environmental or anthropocentric reasons, we should do it in 
order to reduce the harms that nonhuman animals suffer. This 
conflicts significantly with some fundamental environmental ideals 
whose defence is not compatible with the consideration of the 
interests of nonhuman animals. 
1. Introduction 
Humans intervene continuously in the wild. There are several 
reasons why they do so. In most cases, they do it just for the sake of 
clearly recognizable human benefits (as when they transform some 
environment to make it more comfortable and less risky for humans 
to inhabit or visit). In other cases, they intervene in order to maintain
certain patterns of environmental balance. They often do the latter 
because it is in their own interest. The motives for this can be 
variable: the promotion of tourism, an interest in getting some 
resources present in the area in which the intervention takes place, 
scientific, cultural or aesthetical reasons... In other cases, though, 
they do it, allegedly, just for its own sake. The assumption then is that
there is a certain value in the preservation of such balance, reflected 
in Aldo Leopold’s well known dictum “[a] thing is right when it tends 
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to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold 1966, 
262). 
In spite of this, humans very rarely intervene in nature for the 
sake of the interests of other sentient beings, that is, nonhuman 
animals. Moreover, the kinds of intervention they carry out are often 
harmful for them. In fact, if such harm is ever considered, it is only 
insofar as it is instrumentally relevant for the ends that are being 
aimed at. The reduction of the harms animals suffer, per se, is not 
considered a goal that should be pursued when these kinds of 
interventions in nature take place. 
In this paper I will evaluate the reasons we may have to support 
the ends that different interventions aim to achieve. To carry out such
analysis, I will begin with a particular intervention of this kind: the 
reintroduction of wolves. This measure has been considered in recent
years in places such as the Scottish Highlands (see for instance
Watson Feathersome 1997; Nilsen et al. 2007; Wilson 2004; 
Manning et al. 2009; as well as BBC News 1999; 2000 and 2008; 
Morgan 2007; or O’Connell 2008 for media coverage of the issue). 
And it was implemented before in places such as Yellowstone 
National Park, in the United States. This is a measure that would be 
harmful for a number of animals but has been considered in order to 
stop certain changes in the Highlands environment, through the 
imposition on ungulates of what has been called an “ecology of 
fear” (Ripple and Beschta 2004). Such a measure has been much 
discussed, but not because of the consequences it would have for 
nonhuman animals, but rather because of the way it could affect 
some human (non-vital) interests. 
However, in dealing with this question I do not intend to restrict 
my analysis to this particular intervention, nor to this type of 
intervention. Rather, I will consider it as an example to examine the 
more general question of what should be the ends we should aim for
when we intervene in nature. 
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I want to say in advance that I do not intend to make a technical 
case here as regards whether the particular intervention I will tackle 
might achieve its goals or not. Nor will I try to assess any other 
alternative ways in which such ends could be pursued. On the 
contrary, I will try to examine the ethics underlying the acceptance of 
those ends. I will consider the question of whether it is right to harm 
animals in order to achieve such ends. I will then consider the 
reasons we may have to intervene in nature for the sake of a 
completely different purpose, which is to reduce the harms animals 
suffer. I will argue that this is something we should aim for even if it 
strongly conflicted with what environmentalists may regard as 
valuable. 
This means that the position I will defend here should not be 
confused with a criticism of intervention in nature per se. My 
conclusion will be that we are not justified in intervening in nature 
when doing so generates more harm for nonhuman animals. But I 
will also claim that others interventions should be carried out. 
To defend this, I will proceed as follows. First, in section 2, I will
explain the reasons why environmentalists defend the reintroduction 
of wolves and the ways it would be harmful for a number of animals. 
Then, in section 3, I will claim that in proposing such a measure they 
are considering the interests nonhuman animals have in a way that is
completely different from that in which they would consider human 
interests. In section 4 I will argue that treating nonhuman animals 
comparatively worse than humans in cases in which their interests 
are equally important for each of them is unjustified. I will claim that
it is a form of speciesism. In light of this, in section 5, I will argue that
this presents a serious objection to the way in which the interests of 
animals are considered in cases such as the aforementioned. I will 
claim that their supporters assume a speciesist viewpoint. Next, in 
section 6, I will consider the claim that an intervention such as this 
one could be actually good for nonhuman animals even if we would 
never carry it out if humans were affected. I will argue that the issue 
has not been really researched and that there are reasons to doubt 
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this claim. Then, in section 7, I will consider the claim that without 
apex predators herbivores will end up disappearing from places such
as the Highlands. And in section 8 I will claim that this argument is 
inconsistent with the practice of farming. After that, in section 9, I 
consider some potential consequences for other animals due to the 
trophic cascade that the reintroduction of wolves might produce. In
section 10 I will introduce another argument by pointing out that 
there are strong reasons to doubt our common assumptions 
regarding the aggregate wellbeing of animals. I will consider some
facts regarding this that have been presented by Yew-Kwang Ng and 
Alan Dawrst, which may lead us to conclude that the suffering of 
nonhuman animals outweighs their wellbeing. Then, in section 11, I 
will consider whether we may have other reasons to think that this 
intervention brings about a positive outcome. This might be so 
according to a biocentric or an environmental holistic viewpoint. I 
will claim that none of these views can be considered compelling 
ones. Next, in section 12, I will claim that none of this drives us to 
reject intervention in nature. Rather, I will argue that it gives us 
strong reasons to intervene for the sake of the reduction of the harms 
nonhuman animals suffer. Finally, section 13 concludes. 
2. The Ecology of Fear: The Effects of Wolf 
Reintroduction on Elk and Deer 
Reintroduction of wolves is often advocated because it is seen as 
something good in itself (see for instance Mech 1995). It is often 
believed that restoring ecosystems previously existing is something
environmentally valuable (for a criticism of this view, see Shelton 
2004). However, there are other reasons why their reintroduction has
been defended. In the Scottish Highlands this measure has been 
debated recently on the claim that the red deer population has grown 
too much and is causing significant damage to the local vegetation by 
grazing. 
It has been claimed that the reintroduction of wolves would 
reverse this process. This claim is based on conclusions drawn from 
what happened in Yellowstone National Park in the USA in the last 
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decades, where wolf reintroduction was carried out in 1995 and 1996. 
The last wolves originally living in this park in Yellowstone had been 
killed by 1926. However, after much debate, seventy years later 31
Mackenzie Valley wolves taken from Canada were brought to the 
park. Since then, their numbers have grown up to 124 in 2008 (Smith
et al. 2009). Many people find it aesthetic to have wolves back in 
Yellowstone, and this was one of the reasons why they were 
reintroduced. But this measure was also carried out in an attempt to 
restore the trophic chain preexisting the elimination of wolves in the 
park some decades earlier. The reason for this was that, in the 
absence of wolves, elk were free to move around in the park and 
flourish, even though for decades humans hunted them in huge 
numbers. And it was been argued that they were “overgrazing” some 
of the park areas. This claim was seriously disputed (Yellowstone 
National Park, National Park Service 2009). But, environmentalists 
were nevertheless worried about this because elk were grazing one 
particular plant. They were eating the young aspen shoots before they 
grew up, so these trees were not reproducing. For this reason, after 
much discussion, reintroducing the wolves was assumed to be the 
only reliable way to stop this process. 
What are the grounds for this? How can wolves prevent 
ungulates from eating the tree shoots? Of course, one way is by killing 
them and thus reducing their number—it is estimated that around 22 
elk per wolf are killed each year in the park (White et al. 2005, 36), 
and that since wolf reintroduction, the northern Yellowstone elk herd
has declined by around 50% or more (Smith 2005, 23; White et al. 
2005, 35–36). However, the key factor here is something else. It is 
fear. If wolves are around, their potential victims fear grazing in open 
meadows, since these are places in which wolves can see them much 
more easily. So they have to hide in the woods and get their food from
bushes and low tree branches (see Ripple and Larsen 2000; Ripple
and Beschta 2007; see also Preisser et al. 2005). That is the reason 
why the resultant biotic relations that arise from this have received 
the name “ecology of fear”. And the landscape resulting from this, in 
which even though there are herbivores living in the area they do not 
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graze in open fields, has been called “landscape of fear” (Laundre, J. 
W. et al. 2010). 
Now, the way in which herbivores are harmed by this seems 
clear. The harm that is inflicted on them is not reduced to their 
killing, but includes their suffering as well. Fear can be an extremely 
distressing feeling. And this is not the only way in which they are 
harmed by the reintroduction of wolves. They also get poorer 
nourishment as a result of it. This, again, has been observed in 
Yellowstone: because the elk no longer dare to feed out of the woods,
their nutrition had been notably worse since the arrival of the wolves
(Christianson and Creel 2010). (In fact, this was, together with the 
killings, one reason why their population declined. Elk are weaker 
and more liable to die for other reasons, and they have less offspring 
[Creel et al. 2009]). We can thus conclude that this kind of measure 
imposes significant harm on the herbivores who are subjected to an 
ecology of fear. We could also assume that, on the other hand, this 
measure benefits wolves. But this would be a controversial claim. 
Reintroductions do not benefit the actual wolves that are captured, 
transported and released into an unknown environment. They would 
be better off if they were left alone in the places they came from 
(unless they were starving there, or being harmed in some other 
way). We could nevertheless say that the measure would benefit those
wolves who would exist in the future. To make this claim, however, 
we need to assume an impersonal conception of the good according 
to which we are benefiting future beings by making it possible that 
they would exist (a view that entails, for instance, that if we do not 
have children we are failing to do something good—at least in some 
respect—for some potential beings). This is a very controversial 
claim. At any rate, considering the numbers of ungulates and wolves 
involved (recall that an average of 22 elk per wolf were killed each 
year in Yellowstone), it seems clear that even if we accept this claim 
we will still have to conclude that the harm the measure imposes on 
some animals clearly overshadows the benefits it may bring to others. 
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3. A Clearly Different Consideration of Interests 
The reintroduction of wolves is never met without significant 
controversy. Many people strongly oppose it. But the arguments for 
this do not have to do with the interests of nonhuman animals. 
Farmers of neighboring areas are some of those who most strongly 
object to the reintroduction of wolves. They complain that the wolves 
might kill some of the animals they keep on their property. Of course,
their concern is not the good of these animals (after all, they are being 
raised to be eventually sent by the farmers themselves to be killed). 
Rather, it is clear that the interest that the farmers have in not having 
the wolves around is an economic interest. Together with them, 
hunters often oppose these measures, in order to have more 
ungulates available for them to hunt. (Alleged concern for wolf 
attacks on humans is also sometimes expressed as a reason against 
their reintroduction. However, these attacks are so extremely rare 
that this seems to be an argument that is simply used by those who 
oppose the presence of wolves for the other reasons mentioned 
above, rather than something that may actually be of concern to 
them). 
Now, if we compare the weight of the different interests involved 
there is an obvious contrast. An interest in not gaining some more 
money or in getting some entertainment in killing animals is clearly 
less significant than an interest in not losing one’s life (either by the 
action of a wolf or by a human hunter). And it is also inferior to an 
interest in not being subjected to continuous fear and in not being 
forced to be malnourished. However, the former can be crucial in 
stopping these measures from being carried out, while the latter are 
not given any consideration whatsoever. Complaints by farmers and 
hunters are usually taken seriously, while concern for the wellbeing of 
nonhuman animals is not even regarded as a serious concern. How 
can this be? The answer is obvious. The different interests involved in
the issue are not being considered according to the weight they 
actually have for those who possess them. Rather, they are assessed 
in accordance to whether or not they are possessed by humans. It is 
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clear that if humans, rather than ungulates, were killed and caused to 
suffer, reintroduction of wolves would not be even discussed. This 
entails that at least one of the following statements is right: 
a.	 Wolf reintroduction would be a good measure even if a number 
of humans were killed, terrified and starved due to it. 
b. Wolf reintroduction may be considered unacceptable because of
the ways in which it harms the animals they hunt. 
c.	 The interests of humans and nonhumans have to be considered 
in completely different ways. 
For most people, (a) cannot be considered acceptable. This 
includes those theorists who have defended what has been called the 
land ethic and other environmentalist viewpoints (see for instance 
Callicott 1990, 103; 2000, 211). If we grant this to be right, we are left 
with the question of whether it is (b) or (c) we must accept. In order 
to examine this, I will now consider whether claim (c) can be 
justified. 
Questioning Anthropocentric Speciesism 
The view that humans’ interests must be taken into account in 
ways in which nonhumans’ ones need not be considered has been put
forward in several different ways. Its defenses can be grouped into 
five general categories. First of all, this idea is often taken for granted,
or assumed to be right by mere definition. It is claimed that it should 
be obvious that humans’ interests should count for more than 
nonhumans’ ones. This view offers no argument in support of the 
claim it is defending. 
But there are other ways in which this perspective can be 
defended. For instance, it is sometimes claimed that we should 
assume it because humans have an ontological status higher than that
of other animals, or because humans are God’s chosen species (see 
Aristotle 1998, 1254a–1256b; Reichmann 2000). These claims appeal
to intrinsic features or to relations whose existence cannot be 
verified, nor falsified by any means. There is no way in which we may 
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verify that all humans and no other animal have these features or 
relations, because there is no way in which we can test whether 
anyone at all can have them. In this way, these claims are similar to 
definitional ones. They just assume in some way that humans have 
some sort of privileged status, which is what they would need to 
prove. So they fail to justify the idea that human interests are morally 
more important than nonhumans are. 
But, apart from these ones, there are other ways in which the 
predominance of human interests has been defended. It has been also
claimed that humans have certain features (consisting, basically, of 
certain intellectual capacities), which no nonhuman animal 
possesses. And it has been maintained that those features are the 
ones that should determine that someone must be morally 
considered (see, for instance, Descartes 1932; or, in more recent 
times, Carruthers 1992). Besides, it has been argued in other cases 
that humans have some special relations of solidarity, sympathy or 
power in which nonhuman animals are not engaged, and that it is 
this that determines whether or not we should morally consider them
(see, for instance, Whewell 1852, 223). 
However, as many of those who have worked in animal ethics 
have pointed out, these arguments fail to draw a line separating 
humans from nonhumans. There are many humans such as infants 
and those with cognitive disabilities who lack the mentioned 
intellectual capacities. And there are also humans who are alone and 
powerless, and thus fail to have the relations considered to be 
relevant according to these arguments. This means that if we want to 
defend the moral consideration of all human beings, we cannot 
assume the moral relevance of criteria that exclude nonhumans. 
This argument may drive us to reject the idea that these criteria 
are morally relevant, something which we may also conclude by 
means of a different argument, if we consider what follows. Having 
certain capacities or relations is something that can make us liable to 
be harmed or benefited in certain ways. But it is not what determines 
that we can be harmed or benefited as such. This is determined, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
172
rather, by the fact that we are sentient beings, who can have positive
and negative experiences. Hence, if we want to make our decisions 
according to what can be good or bad for those who may be affected 
by them, we need to consider what is relevant for them to be harmed 
or benefited. If we accept this argument based on an appeal to 
relevance, we will reject any criteria for moral consideration which 
differs from sentiency. 
Hence, I conclude that all the defenses of the predominance of 
human interests fail, so we cannot consider this view to be justified. If 
this is right, we must conclude that such a position is a form of 
speciesist discrimination. 
5. A Speciesist Policy 
In line with this, we have to conclude that it is unjustified to 
assume that the reintroduction of wolves, which has been discussed 
in Scotland, is acceptable because the individuals who would be 
harmed by it would be nonhuman animals and not humans. Those 
who defend such a measure are not considering equally the weight of 
the interests of humans and nonhuman animals. Rather, they assume
a speciesist position according to which they are prepared to sacrifice 
the interests of nonhuman animals for purposes for which they would
not sacrifice less significant interests of nonhumans. This has to be 
concluded regardless of whether we agree with this measure or not. 
For even if we thought it would be correct to sacrifice the elk for the 
sake of aspens and other trees, or for further consequences to be 
expected from the conservation of these plants, we might avoid 
speciesism if we also agreed to sacrifice humans for that sake.
However, the latter is never the case. Most people would reject such a
view when it comes to human beings. Although there are some 
theorists who have defended it, such as Linkola (2009), who supports
massive killings of human beings and similar measures for the sake of 
the environment, their positions are widely repudiated. Their 
opinions been rejected by most environmental theorists, who assume 
anthropocentric positions—even if they combine them with an 
environmental holist or biocentrist perspective (see for instance Næss
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2005, 98; Callicott 1989; Norton 1987, 13; Varner 1998, 79; or 
Hargrove 1992). Moreover, it is also apparent that proposals 
involving mass killings of human beings have not been influential 
either in devising the guidelines according to which nature is policed 
today. 
6. Is Reintroduction of Wolves Good for Other 
Animals? 
It could be claimed that even if the reintroduction of wolves were
a speciesist measure, it could still be one we should support, because 
it would be good for nonhuman animals. There is something rather 
odd with this assumption, because those who would reject applying 
such a measure would do so out of their concern for humans 
themselves. If they thought the measure was good for those involved, 
they would have no problem with applying it if all the nonhuman 
animals affected by the measure, for good or bad, were humans. At 
any rate, this is not completely conclusive, because it may just 
happen that the conception of the good of those who would oppose 
this measure if humans were involved were wrong. 
Hence, in order to deal adequately with this problem we need to 
examine whether we have reasons to claim that the benefits that 
some individuals would get if this intervention took place would 
outweigh the harms that others would suffer. It could be assumed 
that in light of the different studies that have been carried out in 
support of this measure we should not doubt the many benefits it 
could bring about for animals as individuals living in an ecosystem 
which appears to be enriched by it. However, such studies have 
pointed out the effect it could have in maintaining a certain balance
in the environment or in stimulating biodiversity. Yet this in no way 
amounts to a clear examination of the problem of whether such 
effects would imply a higher level of aggregate wellbeing for the 
animals involved. Nor does it really give an answer, in particular, to 
the question of whether the introduction of the wolves would cause a 
boost in the levels of wellbeing present in the ecosystem enough to 
outweigh the impact in terms of the suffering and deprivation of 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
174
wellbeing inflicted on deer and other animals. In fact, it is very 
revealing that this question has not really been tackled as such by 
those studies dealing with the consequences of the introduction of 
wolves. The reason is, obviously, that this is not even considered to be
an issue. 
This lack of research means that the case has not been
established that animal wellbeing would be increased, rather than 
reduced, by this measure. Anyway, it could be claimed that this would
be obvious considering some facts that have been empirically studied 
that appear to be relevant for the wellbeing of nonhuman animals. I 
will assess now some reasons that could be pointed out to defend this 
view. 
7. Future Effects on Herbivores 
One argument that could be considered here was presented by
Aldo Leopold (1966 139–140, 268) some decades ago. He claimed 
that after the extermination of wolves in many states in the USA,
deer reproduced in high numbers there, until they ate all the food 
available and, finally, disappeared. Allegedly, this would have a 
terrible impact on the wellbeing of herbivores that could be avoided 
by predators. This claim, however, is far from being clear. 
One could consider that Leopold is referring here to the effects of
the elimination of predators, rather than to their reintroduction. Note
also that his observations took place in recent decades, while in a 
place such as Scotland the last wolves were killed in the 17th or 18th 
century. Consider also that even in a place such as Yellowstone, in 
which the wolves were finally reintroduced, the measure was 
implemented for the impact of elk on some particular plant species, 
not because they were actually “overgrazing” the park (as I pointed 
out above, some studies showed that this was not happening). 
Anyhow, this is not the main point. More important than that is the 
fact that Leopold’s concern here was not really with animal wellbeing,
but with the conservation of a certain ecosystem. Thus, even if deer 
grazing ended up having the effect he describes, it is not clear at all 
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that this would entail more harm than the continuous infliction of an 
ecology of fear on a whole community of deer. At some point, the 
aggregate number of animals harmed and killed by this measure 
would be much higher than the number of animals who would die 
due to lack of food—consider also here something that was already 
pointed out above: when food becomes scarce ungulates have less 
progeny, which reduces the number of individuals actually suffer 
from hunger. 
Apart from this, there is something else going on in the case of
the reintroduction of wolves in Scotland that shows a clear 
inconsistency in its rationale. We will see it now. 
8. An Argument Inconsistent with Farming 
Supporters of wolf reintroduction have claimed that though on 
the one hand it is understandable that farmers fear that wolves would
kill some of the animals they keep as their property, on the other 
hand they should also welcome one consequence the reintroduction 
would have, that is, that there would be less deer to compete with 
grazing animals such as sheep. Furthermore, one of the reasons 
presented to favor the reintroduction of wolves is that deer compete
with sheep for food (Clutton-Brock et al. 2004; Nilsen et al. 2007). 
From a nonspeciesist viewpoint that considers the interests of the 
sheep this is morally objectionable (because sheep farming would be 
seen as unacceptable in the first place). But there is something more 
to say here. 
If there were a true concern for the impact on the vegetation of 
the presence of deer, eliminating sheep farming would be the first 
measure to introduce. Sheep are grazers and their impact on the local
vegetation is similar to that which is considered to be negative when 
deer cause it. It is obvious that farming has the same effects that the 
reintroduction of wolves is intended to deal with, without it being 
considered to be catastrophic by defenders of wolf reintroduction. 
The obvious reason for this is that humans benefit from the 
exploitation of sheep. 
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Moreover, wolves kill many animals kept by humans for their 
exploitation. For instance, it has been estimated that in those areas of
Spain where wolves live, they cause an 80% of sheep mortality for 
what are considered to be “natural causes” (Blanco 2000)—that is, for
those deaths that take place before humans themselves kill the 
sheep—. Yet the fact that wolves kill sheep is not considered to be a 
reason for their reintroduction, but a reason against it. The fact that 
wolves kill animals is seen as something positive if they are animals 
from whose exploitation humans do not profit. Otherwise, it is seen 
as negative, regardless of the fact that the impact on the vegetation of 
all these animals is basically the same. This is also what explains that 
hunters see the fact that wolves reduce the population of some 
ungulates as negative: because they see these animals, as farmers see 
sheep, as animals available for them to use (as “game” to be hunted). 
What is more, as Nilsen (2007, 1000) points out, and one can 
discover easily by taking a look at the official records on the issue 
(Scottish Government Rural and Environment Research and Analysis
Directorate 2010), sheep farming is maintained in Scotland basically 
thanks to subsidies. Otherwise it would be hardly a profitable activity.
If we consider the interests of the deer, this presents the 
reintroduction of wolves as a cynical measure. 
It could be claimed that there is a difference between the impact 
that sheep and deer cause, which is that deer graze in what are 
considered to be more or less “wild” areas, while sheep graze in 
places that are closer to where humans live or that have been more 
affected by human action. But this is not a good argument. Firstly, as 
a matter of fact this is often not so. Secondly, this assumes a 
questionable distinction between those areas of lands that are 
regarded to be more and less worthy of conservation in a certain 
state. The reason why this distinction is questionable is that it is 
based on considerations that have to do with human action. Some 
areas are considered to be more valuable because humans have had a 
lesser impact so far on them, because they are not privately owned, 
for aesthetical reasons, etc. But none of this means necessarily that 
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the conservation of their environmental value could have an effect 
upon the wellbeing of animals different from that which would be 
brought about if the measure affected other areas. 
9. Trophic Cascade Effects 
Apart from the argument we have just considered, there is 
another way in which we could believe that this intervention could 
raise the aggregate wellbeing of nonhumans. Perhaps this could 
happen through some more or less complex alterations in the trophic 
chain. Of course, if we only consider wolves and the animals they 
hunt, the reintroduction of wolves has a clearly negative impact in 
terms of animal wellbeing. But this measure may have many others 
consequences. For instance, it has been observed that the 
disappearance of wolves in the USA has led to an increase in the 
population of mesopredators such as coyotes, which has meant that 
some of the animals they hunt, such as pronghorn antelopes, have 
been killed in higher numbers (see Prugh 2009). And far more 
complex trophic relations may be altered by whether there are wolves
around or not. For sure, if this entailed less total suffering for wild 
animals we would have strong reasons to support this measure. 
However, such complex effects remain yet to be investigated in 
enough detail. Things could be the other way around. We lack an 
understanding of the whole ramifications, for good or bad, upon the 
wellbeing of nonhuman animals of the introduction of an ecology of 
fear. However, we are certain of the harm imposed on the victims of 
it. This gives us a pro tanto reason to reject such measure. 
This could be responded to by pointing out that the 
reintroduction of wolves boosts biodiversity because, when they kill 
other animals, scavengers have more food, which allows them to 
reproduce themselves and multiply. This is so in particular in the case
of insects. Therefore, this could be something that would increase, 
rather than decrease, animal wellbeing. The reason would be, simply, 
that there could be more sentient animals alive (on the question on 
insect sentiency see Smith 1991). This may seem a reasonable 
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argument at first sight. However, there are some strong reasons to 
reject it. I will present them now. 
10. The Question of the Predominance of Suffering 
over Happiness in Nature 
Yew-Kwang Ng (1995) and Alan Dawrst (2007) have claimed
that the amount of suffering in nature vastly exceeds the amount of 
wellbeing. In a nutshell, their argument can be reconstructed as 
follows. The reproductive strategies which maximize inclusive fitness 
very commonly entail that many more animals are born than those 
who survive (for a locus classicus on this see Pianka 1970). The 
reason is, of course, that the chances that an animal that has just 
come into existence has of reaching sexual maturity and procreating 
can be extremely low. This happens in particular in the case of small 
animals, who may lay hundreds, or even several thousands eggs. It 
also happens that these animals are, by far, the ones that exist in the 
highest numbers in nature. This means that the majority of the 
sentient animals that come to existence die very soon after they start 
to be sentient. Many of them die from starvation. Others are eaten 
alive by predators or parasites. This means that most of these animals
in almost all certainty experience more suffering than positive 
wellbeing in their lives. In other words, that their lives are not worth 
living. Given this, the assumption that the conservation of 
environmental balance is on the overall good for animals appears to
be highly questionable. It would be false if we hold an egalitarian, a 
sufficientarian or a maximin conception of the good. Or if we assume 
any other view according to which an outcome in which some
individuals gets some benefits but some others get harmed cannot be 
good (as some who hold deontological or virtue ethics approaches 
may assume). But it would also be wrong even if we set aside any of 
these normative views and accepted an aggregative and impersonal 
conception of the good. The reason is that those animals whose lives 
are not worth living appear to be, by a large amount, the greater part 
of the sentient animals existing on Earth’s biosphere. Given this, 
those theories that are based on impersonal views of the good (such 
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as utilitarianism) would have to join all the previously mentioned 
perspectives in their rejection of the present state of affairs as a good 
one. 
Both Ng and Dawrst assume extremely cautious positions as 
regards the conclusions to be implied from the facts and arguments 
they present, and just make the claim that more resources should be 
employed in doing research on the suffering and wellbeing of animals
in nature. This is a very conservative conclusion for them to make, in 
light of their argument. Anyway, according to this conservative 
conclusion we cannot just assume that the existing balance of the 
environment is positive for animals. Ng (1995, 261) wonders: 
“without welfare biological studies, how do we know that the natural 
equilibrium in the biosphere is desirable[?]” Most of us seem to take 
for granted that this is just the case without really spending much
time thinking about it. But, on reflection, it is clear that Ng’s is 
correct in wondering whether this is so, at least if we accept that what
matters is the good of sentient individuals. So the assumption that 
the current balance of ecosystem is good for animals, that is widely 
accepted without being really considered in sufficient detail, cannot 
be considered a warranted one. All this should drive us to consider in 
a completely different light the question of intervention in nature, not
just in the case we are considering here, but also in general. 
11. The Rejection of Holistic and Biocentric Positions 
We have seen that we have reasons to reject those interventions 
in nature that harm nonhuman animals. This will be resisted by those
who support an ethic according to which there are other values in 
nature that should be protected. Defenders of environmental holism 
or biocentrism would argue in this way. However, unless we assume a
speciesist viewpoint, their positions will be rejected by most of us, as 
I have pointed out above. With the exception of a tiny minority of 
more or less consistent environmentalists such as Linkola, most of 
those who have claimed to defend either biocentrism or 
environmental holism have in fact combined these views with an 
anthropocentric speciesist position. Otherwise, they would accept the 
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mass killing of humans for the sake of environmental balance. After 
all, we all know that the way in which humans alter such balance 
vastly outweighs the way in which any ungulate or other animal does. 
However, as we have seen, neither Callicott nor, of course, Leopold, 
held such a view. Neither do theorists such as Paul Taylor (1986) or 
Gary Varner (2002), who have raised the flag of biocentrism, assume 
that the value of the life of a human is tantamount to that of 
nonsentient living beings such as prokaryota (bacteria, archaea) or 
nonsentient eukaryota (such as protista, fungi or plants). Or, for that 
matter, that our lives are as valuable as the lives of each of the cells
that compose our own bodies. 
There is a conception of value that explains this while rejecting 
speciesism. In light with what I have claimed in section 4, we can 
defend that those who can be benefited or harmed are those 
individuals who have the capacity to have positive or negative 
experiences. A life with no experiences at all would be of no value. In
fact, there would be no subject living it. And ecosystems are also 
entities which are not conscious. Only the individuals who live in 
them are. Hence, the latter are the only ones to be morally 
considered, not ecosystems, biocenoses or biotas as such. This being
so, we should care about the consequences that interventions in 
nature have to sentient animals, rather than to nonsentient beings or 
ecosystems. We may, of course, need to worry about how such 
interventions can affect the latter, but for indirect reasons concerning 
the good of sentient beings. 
This also drives us to reject a distinction that a number of 
environmentalists draw between animals who would belong 
respectively to what are often called in a rather optimistic fashion the 
“biotic community” and the “mixed community (of humans and 
domestic nonhuman animals)” (Callicott 1989). This distinction 
appears to be completely unacceptable from a nonspeciesist 
viewpoint (which, incidentally, may also find diversionary the use of 
the term ‘community’ to name a relation based on aggression). The 
same principles we may have when it comes to consider those 
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nonhuman animals that are exploited by human beings should apply
in the case of those living in the wild. There is no sound reason to 
discriminate against the former, or against the latter. Since both can 
be positively and negatively affected by their interaction with other 
beings, the harms they can suffer need to be considered in the very 
same way. 
12. Changing the Aims of Intervention 
What I have just pointed out has another significant corollary. 
Thus far I have claimed that interventions that aim at the 
conservation of a certain environmental balance by harming sentient 
animals are objectionable. However, nothing from what we have seen
entails that there is anything inherently wrong in intervening or 
avoiding intervention in nature. It is obvious that this need not be the
case if we assume an anthropocentric view. But it is important to note
that the same would be true if we considered the matter from a 
nonanthropocentric perspective. We have seen that if we assume a 
holistic perspective according to which, to put it in line with 
Leopold’s motto, “the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community” would be the locus of value, we would still have reasons 
to intervene in nature. In fact, reintroductions of wolves may be an 
example of a policy in line with this. But if we assume a nonspeciesist 
position according to which the interests of all the sentient beings 
involved should be considered, we would also have reasons to 
intervene in the wild. However, such interventions would have to be 
aimed at reducing, rather than increasing, the harms that nonhuman 
animals suffer. This would be the case, in particular, in light of the 
points made by Ng and Dawrst, according to which important 
interventions in nature would be very desirable from the point of 
view of nonhuman animals. 
We have also seen that the view that the conservation of the 
environmental balance of ecosystems is something valuable in itself 
is, in fact, highly questionable. This being so, it seems we can modify
the claim presented above. I have argued that when we intervene in 
the wild we should do so in ways that do not have a negative impact 
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on animal wellbeing. However, we can now go a bit further, and claim
something more. We also have reasons to intervene in nature when 
doing so would decrease the harms nonhuman animals suffer. In fact,
we would have reasons to do so even if that conflicted with what 
defenders of biocentrism or environmental holism may regard as 
valuable, such as environmental complexity or stability, species 
conservation or aesthetical appreciation of nature. These are 
currently seen as ideals we should try to further whenever they do not
conflict with significant human interests. However, we have seen we 
have reasons to reject biocentrism, environmental and speciesist 
thinking. This means that we should not try to further these 
environmental ideals either if they conflict with the interests of 
nonhuman animals. This gives us clear reasons against trying to 
introduce an ecology of fear into Scotland, or into other places in
which this measure is being discussed. But it also gives us strong 
reasons to consider other ways in which we could intervene in nature 
in order to minimize animals’ suffering and death. 
13. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that (i) intervention is not inherently 
wrong; (ii) speciesism is unjustified; (iii) the idea that environmental 
balance is valuable in itself is unwarranted; and (iv) biocentrism must
be rejected. What follows from these four claims is that we should 
change the aims that we are trying to achieve when we intervene in 
nature. The good of nonhuman animals must be the central concern
for that. Regarding the particular case I have examined here, I have 
not denied that the reintroduction of wolves may be useful to achieve 
some purposes. Rather, I have defended that the purposes we should 
aim towards when we intervene in nature are completely different 
ones, even if this conclusion seems, at first, counterintuitive. We 
should be wary of our initial intuitions regarding this, given that we 
have been raised in societies in which nonhuman animals are seldom 
seriously considered. 
The question of the interests of animals living in the wild and the
disvalues present in nature has not been properly addressed to date 
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(for exceptions see Sapontzis 1984; Olivier 1993; Bonnardel 1996; 
Cowen 2003; Fink 2005). With regards to this, I want to claim that 
even if the arguments presented here were wrong, they would at least 
show that this issue is a very serious one which deserves much more 
attention than the one it has received so far. 
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